The farmer is still the loser: How Kenya’s agricultural revolution risks enriching everyone except the producer

In Part 1, we examined the betrayal of the hustler economy promise. In Part 2, we confronted the administration’s war on Gen Z and its assault on constitutional freedoms. In Part 3, we turned to the education crisis, while Part 4 examined the healthcare gamble and its implications for ordinary Kenyans. Now, in Part 5, we turn to agriculture: A sector President William Ruto promised to transform, but where the fundamental question remains disturbingly familiar. Is the bottom-up economic model actually empowering the farmer, or are subsidies, imports, intermediaries and powerful commercial interests enriching everyone except the person who produces the food?

If there is one sector in which President William Ruto should have been able to demonstrate the practical value of his bottom-up economic philosophy, it is agriculture.

Agriculture is not simply another economic sector in Kenya. It is the foundation of rural livelihoods, food security, manufacturing, employment and a substantial proportion of the country’s export earnings.

Millions of households depend on farming, directly or indirectly. For them, agricultural policy is not an ideological debate or an abstract economic proposition. It determines whether they can feed their families, educate their children and earn a decent living.

The administration understood this political and economic reality.

It made agricultural transformation a central pillar of its economic agenda, placing particular emphasis on subsidised fertiliser, improved productivity, irrigation and the revival of agricultural value chains.

These were sensible priorities. Indeed, they were necessary. But the gap between the ambition and its implementation has raised difficult questions about competence, accountability and, ultimately, who is benefiting from the government’s interventions.

Perhaps the most damaging controversy involved the subsidised fertiliser programme.

The programme was intended to lower production costs and increase agricultural output. Yet, in April 2024, allegations that counterfeit or substandard fertiliser had entered the distribution system exposed serious weaknesses in procurement, quality control and public accountability.

The government subsequently closed the KEL Chemicals factory in Thika and revoked its manufacturing licence pending investigations, according to the Kenya News Agency's report of April 14, 2024.

The implications were particularly serious because fertiliser subsidies are supposed to protect farmers from high input costs and improve productivity. If the quality of the product supplied is questionable, the farmer is effectively exposed twice: First through the cost of production and then through the possibility of reduced yields.

There is something profoundly wrong with a system in which a government promises to support farmers but cannot guarantee the quality of a critical agricultural input.

Public programmes intended to improve agricultural productivity must be accompanied by transparent procurement, independent quality verification and effective accountability. Anything less leaves farmers vulnerable to the very failures the subsidies are supposed to address.

But the fertiliser controversy is only one part of a much larger problem.

The farmer carries the risk. Everyone else takes the margin.

Kenya’s farmers have long complained about the unequal distribution of value along agricultural supply chains.

In sectors such as tea, coffee, dairy and rice, producers often carry the greatest risks but exercise relatively little bargaining power.

They bear the costs of land preparation, inputs, labour, unpredictable weather and production. Yet the price they eventually receive is frequently determined by intermediaries, processors, distributors and market arrangements over which they have limited influence.

This raises a fundamental question about the bottom-up economic model: What does economic empowerment mean if the person at the beginning of the value chain remains the least powerful and among the least rewarded?

Agricultural transformation cannot be measured simply by how much food a country produces. It must also be measured by how much wealth remains with the people who produce it.

The rice sector provides a particularly revealing illustration.

Farmers in Mwea and other rice-producing areas have repeatedly raised concerns about competition from imports, market access and the protection of local production.

There is nothing inherently wrong with importing food. Kenya cannot reasonably pursue food security by ignoring the realities of domestic supply and demand. Imports can help stabilise prices, address shortages and protect consumers from excessive food costs.

But the government must answer a more important question: Are domestic producers being given a fair opportunity to compete?

A country cannot claim to be pursuing agricultural transformation while leaving its farmers exposed to structural disadvantages that make local production increasingly difficult to sustain.

That requires reliable irrigation, affordable inputs, efficient storage, modern processing facilities, accessible markets and predictable export-import policies.

It also requires the government to resist the temptation to treat agricultural imports as a convenient short-term solution while neglecting the long-term competitiveness of domestic production.

The same principle applies to the administration’s livestock vaccination initiative.

A national programme involving millions of animals requires technical preparedness, transparent communication and meaningful engagement with livestock keepers. Public confidence cannot simply be demanded, particularly where interventions affect household assets and livelihoods.

Farmers and pastoralists are not passive recipients of government policy. They are stakeholders whose knowledge, concerns and economic interests must be taken seriously.

Agricultural transformation is not a public relations exercise. More broadly, agricultural policy must be assessed against measurable outcomes. Have yields increased sustainably? Have farmers’ production costs fallen? Are farm-gate prices improving? Have post-harvest losses declined? Are domestic producers becoming more competitive?

And, perhaps most importantly, are farmers receiving a fairer share of the value generated by their own labour?

These are the questions that should determine whether the government’s agricultural agenda is succeeding.

A government cannot claim agricultural transformation simply because it has distributed millions of bags of fertiliser or allocated billions of shillings to subsidies.

Nor can it point to increased production alone if farmers remain trapped in low incomes, unreliable markets and an unequal distribution of agricultural profits.

The measure of success is whether the farmer is economically better off.

There is also a governance dimension that cannot be ignored.

Whenever public subsidies, procurement contracts and strategic agricultural imports become vulnerable to political influence, opaque commercial arrangements or powerful cartels, the intended beneficiaries risk being pushed to the margins.

This is not a minor administrative inconvenience. It goes to the heart of whether public policy is serving the public interest or creating opportunities for politically connected commercial interests.

Agriculture should not become another arena in which public money is deployed in the name of ordinary citizens while the greatest benefits accrue elsewhere.

The government must demonstrate that agricultural interventions are transparent, competitive and designed around the interests of producers, rather than the commercial or political interests of those controlling the supply chains.

The cardinal sin: Betraying the very people the bottom-up model promised to empower

The cardinal sin is the failure to translate agricultural interventions into a consistently more productive, competitive and rewarding environment for the farmer.

The bottom-up economic model cannot succeed if the people at the beginning of the agricultural value chain remain the least powerful and least rewarded.

It cannot claim to have transformed agriculture if farmers still struggle with expensive inputs, uncertain markets, inadequate infrastructure and prices that barely compensate them for their labour and investment.

And it cannot claim to have empowered rural Kenya if the farmer remains dependent on government subsidies, vulnerable to middlemen and exposed to commercial interests that wield greater influence over the market than the producer.

Kenya’s farmers do not need another political declaration about agricultural transformation. They do not need another round of impressive statistics about fertiliser distribution, budget allocations or government initiatives.

They need affordable and reliable inputs. They need fair markets, predictable prices, decent infrastructure and protection from exploitation. Above all, they need to earn a decent living from farming.

A bottom-up revolution that leaves the farmer at the bottom is not a revolution. It is another broken promise.