As Kenya approaches the 2027 General Election, one question is becoming increasingly central to the national political debate: Does President William Ruto deserve a second term?
The election is, in many respects, shaping up to be a referendum on his first presidency: Its promises, policy choices, achievements, failures and, ultimately, its impact on the lives of ordinary Kenyans.
In this seven-part series, Inflection examines what we consider the seven cardinal sins of the Ruto presidency. Our intention is not simply to criticise an administration, nor to deny that it may have undertaken worthwhile initiatives. Rather, we seek to assess its record against seven fundamental dimensions of the relationship between government and citizens: Economic fairness, constitutional rights, social mobility, human welfare, productive livelihoods, institutional accountability, and Kenya’s dignity and standing in the international community.
The fundamental question is not whether the Ruto administration has done anything. It is whether the lives of ordinary Kenyans are materially better, the institutions of the Republic are stronger, and the country is more accountable than it was when he assumed office.
That is the standard against which this presidency, and the seven cardinal sins examined in this series, should be judged.
THE RUTO PRESIDENCY: SEVEN CARDINAL SINS · PART 2 OF 7
How an administration turned the most patriotic and nationalistic citizens into enemies of the State
The Gen Z protests of June 2024 were about much more than the Finance Bill. They exposed a widening rupture between the Kenyan government and a generation demanding economic opportunity, constitutional rights, accountable leadership and respect for human life. The second instalment of Inflection’s series examines how the Ruto administration’s response to that moment of civic awakening turned a dispute over economic policy into a profound crisis of public trust.
Perhaps the most consequential political miscalculation of the Ruto presidency was its initial response to the Gen Z protests of June 2024.
As we argued in Part 1, President William Ruto came to power promising economic transformation and opportunities for ordinary Kenyans. His hustler narrative had particular appeal among young people, who were attracted to the promise that their economic circumstances would no longer be determined by their social background or proximity to political power.
Yet, when that generation mobilised against the Finance Bill 2024, the government appeared to interpret its demands as a challenge to presidential authority rather than an opportunity to listen, engage and reconsider its priorities.
The protests began with opposition to proposed tax increases. But they quickly became something much bigger.
Young Kenyans were questioning unemployment, corruption, public extravagance, political accountability and the apparent disconnect between the sacrifices demanded of citizens and the quality of governance they received.
Unlike traditional political demonstrations, the movement was largely decentralised. It was organised through digital platforms, driven by citizens who did not wait for established political parties to provide leadership, and sustained by a shared sense of frustration with the political establishment.
This was an important development in Kenya’s political evolution.
For decades, political mobilisation in Kenya has largely been mediated by established political personalities, ethnic coalitions and party structures. The Gen Z movement demonstrated that citizens could organise around issues, challenge government policy and demand accountability without seeking permission from the traditional political establishment.
It was, in many respects, a new expression of citizenship: Less deferential to political authority, more comfortable with independent organisation and increasingly insistent that elected leaders must answer to the people.
The government’s response was deeply troubling.
The deployment of security forces against demonstrators, reports of the use of live ammunition, arbitrary arrests, abductions and enforced disappearances transformed a dispute over taxation into a national human rights crisis.
According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR), the Commission documented 60 deaths following the anti-Finance Bill demonstrations in June 2024. Its wider assessment recorded 610 injuries between June and November 2024, as well as 74 cases of enforced disappearance during the same period.
The gravity of these events was also documented by Human Rights Watch, which reported that security forces abducted, arbitrarily arrested, tortured and killed people perceived to be leaders of the protests.
These figures represent something much more profound than statistics.
They represent families that lost children, parents who searched for missing relatives and young citizens whose understanding of their relationship with the State was fundamentally altered.
The constitutional implications are equally serious.
Article 37 of Kenya’s Constitution guarantees every person the right, peaceably and unarmed, to assemble, demonstrate, picket and present petitions to public authorities.
These are not privileges bestowed by the President or concessions granted by the government. They are constitutional rights.
Equally, the State has a duty to protect life, maintain public order and ensure that security agencies operate within the law. Where individuals commit offences, the appropriate response is lawful investigation and prosecution, not collective punishment or the indiscriminate use of force.
The distinction is fundamental: Enforcing the law is a legitimate responsibility of government; violating the Constitution in the name of enforcing the law is not.
The withdrawal of the Finance Bill and the subsequent dismissal of most of the Cabinet acknowledged the political gravity of the protests. President Ruto announced that he would not sign the Bill on June 26, 2024, while the Cabinet dismissal followed on July 11, 2024.
These developments were significant political concessions. But changing ministers is not the same as restoring public confidence.
Nor does the formation of new political arrangements resolve questions about accountability for deaths, injuries, disappearances and alleged abuses by security agencies.
The government must ultimately be judged not by the personnel changes it makes or the political arrangements it negotiates, but by whether it upholds the Constitution, protects citizens and holds those responsible for violations accountable.
The deeper problem is that the administration appears to have underestimated the political significance of a generation that is increasingly informed, connected and unwilling to accept the conventional bargain between politicians and voters.
Young Kenyans are not necessarily united by one political ideology, nor do they share a single electoral preference – tribal or otherwise. What increasingly connects them is a demand that public authority be exercised transparently, responsibly and accountably.
They want employment, affordable living, functioning institutions and a government that respects their constitutional rights. They want their taxes to translate into public services and national development. Above all, they want to be treated as citizens whose voices matter, rather than as subjects expected to accept decisions made on their behalf.
There is an important distinction between opposing a government’s policies and opposing the country.
Criticism of the President is not treason. Demanding accountability is not subversion. And peaceful protest is not an attack on the Republic.
Indeed, the right to challenge government is one of the defining characteristics of a constitutional democracy. A government that cannot tolerate criticism is fundamentally at odds with the democratic principles upon which its authority rests.
The cardinal sin was allowing a legitimate disagreement over economic policy to deteriorate into a crisis of state legitimacy.
A government can survive an unpopular Finance Bill. It can survive electoral opposition and political protests. It can even recover from serious policy miscalculations.
What is much harder to repair is the loss of trust between the State and an entire generation of citizens.
The question confronting President Ruto is therefore no longer simply whether Gen Z will support him in 2027.
It is whether his administration understands that the young people it governs are citizens to be heard, not adversaries to be defeated.
And that, ultimately, is the difference between governing a country and merely exercising power over its people.