An electoral commission is not just another government institution. It is the custodian of the people's sovereign will, the referee in the contest for political power and, ultimately, the guarantor of the legitimacy of government. Its work is therefore too consequential to be compromised by internal intrigues, administrative confusion, questionable appointments, managerial instability or institutional paralysis.

In a democracy, the credibility of an election does not begin when ballot papers are printed, polling stations opened or results announced. It begins much earlier, in the manner in which the electoral commission conducts its affairs, manages its personnel, spends public resources, makes decisions and prepares for the enormous responsibility entrusted to it by the Constitution.

This is precisely why the state of affairs emerging at the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) should worry every Kenyan, irrespective of political affiliation.

With the August 2027 General Election approaching fast, the country needs an electoral commission operating at the highest levels of institutional efficiency, professional competence, independence and integrity. Instead, troubling accounts of management instability, persistent acting appointments, unexplained staff movements, procurement turbulence and communication failures are raising fundamental questions about the Commission's preparedness.

These are not inconsequential administrative disagreements. They go to the heart of whether the institution is sufficiently organised, cohesive and professionally equipped to discharge one of the most demanding constitutional responsibilities in the country.

An election is a massive national undertaking. It requires meticulous planning, coordination across all 47 counties, reliable procurement systems, competent personnel, effective voter education, robust technology, transparent decision-making and the capacity to respond to unforeseen challenges. Every department must know its responsibilities, every officer must understand their mandate and every decision must be guided by law, professionalism and the overriding public interest.

There is very little room for improvisation.

The experience of other democracies should put our own electoral managers to shame. Consider India. The Election Commission of India successfully organised the 2024 General Election involving approximately 979.8 million registered voters spread across one of the world's largest and most geographically diverse countries. The exercise involved more than one million polling stations and an enormous deployment of personnel, logistical resources and election-management systems.

The scale is almost incomprehensible. Yet the institution has developed systems that allow it to plan and administer an electoral exercise of extraordinary complexity, involving multiple states, remote communities, different climatic conditions and enormous logistical demands. The election was conducted in seven phases, allowing the Commission to manage the exercise across the country.

Brazil offers another instructive example. During its 2022 General Election, the country's Superior Electoral Court had to organise voting for approximately 156.45 million registered voters across 5,570 municipalities, with polling also taking place in 181 cities abroad. The exercise required hundreds of thousands of electronic voting machines, extensive logistical coordination and approximately 2.2 million poll workers and support personnel.

These countries are not without electoral controversies or operational challenges. Nor should Kenya blindly transplant their systems. But Kenya, with an electorate considerably smaller than those of India and Brazil, should be capable of organising a highly professional and credible election. What it requires is an electoral commission that understands the gravity of its mandate and has the institutional discipline to execute it.

The IEBC cannot afford to approach 2027 as though it were an ordinary administrative assignment.

The Constitution places enormous responsibility on the Commission. It must conduct and supervise elections and referenda, ensure that elections are free and fair, facilitate the participation of citizens and safeguard the integrity of the electoral process. These obligations cannot be discharged effectively by an institution whose internal arrangements are constantly unsettled.

The concerns emerging from Anniversary Towers are therefore particularly disturbing.

Why, with the election approaching, is the Commission yet to settle critical leadership positions? Why are so many directorates operating under acting arrangements? Why should experienced senior officers be subjected to repeated transfers and apparent institutional uncertainty? What explains the extraordinary turnover in sensitive departments such as procurement? And what message does this send to the officers expected to deliver a credible national election?

An electoral commission depends heavily on institutional memory. Its personnel must understand the electoral calendar, procurement requirements, voter registration systems, boundary management, technology, logistics and the legal framework governing elections. This knowledge is accumulated over years and cannot simply be replaced through administrative reshuffles.

Constantly unsettling the institution's professional personnel, particularly at a time when election preparations should be gathering momentum, risks undermining precisely the institutional capacity the country needs.

Procurement, in particular, deserves special attention. Elections involve billions of shillings in public expenditure, with strict timelines and complex technical requirements. Delays, unexplained changes of personnel, questionable procurement decisions or inadequate oversight can have consequences that extend far beyond financial accountability. They can compromise the Commission's ability to deliver essential electoral materials and services on time.

There is also the question of staff morale. An institution cannot demand exceptional performance from its employees while allowing an environment of uncertainty, suspicion and apparent administrative instability to take root. Professional officers need clear reporting structures, predictable career progression, fair treatment and confidence that appointments and promotions are determined by competence rather than considerations unrelated to merit.

Equally important is communication. The IEBC must understand that public confidence is built through openness, timely explanations and a willingness to answer legitimate questions. Silence in the face of serious concerns only deepens public suspicion. An independent commission should have nothing to fear from scrutiny. Indeed, transparency should be one of its greatest institutional strengths.

The Commission must also appreciate that Kenya's electoral history leaves little room for complacency. The country has experienced disputed elections, prolonged political tensions, litigation and, in 2007, the tragic consequences of a breakdown in electoral confidence. The lessons of that period, as well as the controversies surrounding subsequent elections, should have made institutional preparedness an absolute priority.

The responsibility of the current commissioners is therefore enormous. They must demonstrate that they are building an institution capable of conducting an election that Kenyans can trust, including those whose preferred candidates lose.

That is the ultimate test of an electoral commission. It is not whether the governing party is satisfied, whether the opposition is pleased or whether the commissioners enjoy the confidence of the political establishment. It is whether the electoral process is demonstrably impartial, transparent, verifiable and compliant with the Constitution and the law.

The IEBC must also resist the temptation to mistake public relations for preparedness. Conferences, stakeholder meetings, strategic plans and assurances of commitment are important, but they cannot substitute for functioning departments, competent leadership, credible procurement processes and demonstrable progress against the electoral calendar.

The Commission's own Election Operations Plan for 2025-2027 recognises the significance of the task ahead. The challenge now is to translate those commitments into measurable operational results.

There is still time to correct the situation, but that window is narrowing. The Commission must urgently stabilise its management, conclude outstanding appointments, restore confidence among its employees, address concerns surrounding promotions and transfers, strengthen procurement oversight and establish clear accountability across all directorates.

It must also communicate honestly with Kenyans about its preparedness, the challenges it faces and the corrective measures being undertaken.

There is an even more fundamental concern that deserves to be stated plainly. Based on the institutional failures and troubling developments emerging from this investigation, our eventual assessment is that this is the worst electoral commission Kenya has had in its electoral history. It is an exceptionally serious judgment, but one that the evidence being assembled in this series must be allowed to test and substantiate.

Unless the Commission puts its house in order with urgency, it risks presiding over one of the most unfair, chaotic and disastrous elections in Kenya's multiparty history. On the evidence to be examined, the present IEBC risks being judged more harshly than the commissions led by Chesoni, Kivuitu, Hassan and even Chebukati.

That is not a distinction any electoral commission should aspire to.

Kenya does not need an IEBC that merely survives until August 2027. It needs one that is professionally prepared, institutionally stable, operationally efficient and sufficiently independent to withstand political pressure from every direction.

The right to elect leaders is not a favour extended to Kenyans by the State. It is a constitutional right. And the institution entrusted with protecting that right must be equal to the responsibility.

The 2027 General Election is too important to be left to an institution that has not put its own house in order.

IEBC must get its act together. Kenya cannot afford another electoral disaster.